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abstract
In this article I argue that the fundamental axiological claim of the New Natural 
Law Theory, according to which human life has an intrinsically valuable, cannot 
be defended within the framework assumed by the New Natural Law Theory itself, 
and further, that such a claim turns out to be false relative to a wider eudaimonistic 
framework that the Natural Law theorist is committed to accept. I do this this by 
adopting a dialectical standpoint which excludes any assumptions that could be de-
nied by the New Natural Law theorist, except for the axiological claim, and show that 
the New Natural Law theorist cannot argue for the axiological claim’s plausibility, 
and  moreover, that in such a setting the New Natural Law theorist is compelled to 
replace the axiological claim by the claim that human life is instrumentally valuable.
Keywords: morals, New Natural Law, human life.
resumen
La afirmación axiológica fundamental de la Nueva Ley Natural (nln) según la cual 
la vida humana tiene un valor intrínseco, no puede ser defendida dentro del marco 
teórico asumido por dicha teoría, y resulta ser falsa en un marco eudemonista más 
amplio, que debe ser aceptado por el teórico de la ley natural. Se asume una posición 
dialéctica que excluye cualquier suposición que pueda ser negada por el teórico de 
la nln, con excepción de la afirmación axiológica, y se demuestra que él no puede 
mostrar la plausibilidad de la afirmación axiológica; más aún, que se ve forzado a 
reemplazar la afirmación axiológica por la aceptación de que la vida humana tiene 
un valor instrumental.
Palabras clave: moral, Nueva Ley Natural, vida humana.
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Introduction
Perhaps the most distinctive normative thesis put forward by the 
ethical theory that has come to be known as “New Natural Law Theory”,1 
is what Germain Grisez called “the basic principle of the inviolability 
of human life” (Grisez 1970 65) the immediate implication of which is 
that human life as such should be respected and protected. 
Although the idea behind such a principle has been expressed in 
the Natural Law (nl) tradition in terms of the peculiar integrity, dignity, 
or sanctity inherent to human life, it is John Finnis’ particular way of 
formulating this idea, equating human life to a basic human value or 
good (cf. Finnis 1980 86) that has enjoyed the widest acceptance among 
more recent philosophical proponents of this theory. It is this axiological 
claim (as I shall now refer to it) that I will be discussing in this article–the 
axiological claim that is meant to support the principle of inviolability, 
and the whole edifice of normative implications that derive from it. 
Notice that the axiological claim that human life is a basic or intrin-
sic good for human beings is not a prescriptive claim, in the sense that 
it does not tell us how we should behave with regard to human life or 
what sort of attitudes should we adopt with regard to it. The axiological 
claim is a kind of evaluative claim, in that it says that a life is an intrinsic 
good, and it only acquires a prescriptive force (such as the one specified 
in the principle of inviolability, a prescriptive principle) when attached 
to the prescriptive principle or guideline of Respect for Goods, accord-
ing to which “we should never intentionally destroy an instance of a 
human good because doing so would be an act of practical irrational-
ity” (Gómez-Lobo 47). Given that the claim I will be discussing in this 
article is the axiological claim underpinning the principle of inviolability, 
my discussion will not be primarily a discussion about the principle of 
inviolability and its prescriptive implications, but rather a discussion 
about the axiology or theory of value underlying that principle. 
A basic human good can be characterized both as: a) something 
that is desirable or worth pursuing for its own sake (and not only instru-
mentally); and as b) something that can be described as an integral 
aspect of human flourishing or well-being. I shall assume, as do new nl 
theorists, that this double characterization amounts to the same thing: 
“the fundamental reasons for acting are aspects of an agent’s well-being” 
(Murphy 176).2 Therefore, the claim I shall be discussing in this article 
1 I borrow the label from Hittinger (1987). Hittinger has in mind the theory initially de-
veloped by Germain Grisez, Joseph Boyle and John Finnis in the seventies and eighties.
2 This is what Murphy calls the “real identity thesis”. Chappell calls it the “Working 
Hypothesis” (cf. Chappell 24-26).
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is that human life, as such, is a basic human good in accordance with 
these two characterizations.3
When referring to “a human being that is alive”, let the provisional 
understanding of this be in the most basic biological sense of the phrase. 
“By life”, says Gómez-Lobo, “I mean here human life at the basic biologic-
al level, manifesting itself in the typical functions of a human organism 
(taking nourishment, growing, etc.)” (Gómez-Lobo 10). The rationale for 
this definition of “human life” is that the content of human life in the 
axiological claim must be identical to the content of human life in the 
principle of inviolability, for otherwise the axiological principle would 
fail to support the latter principle. And given that the most distinctive 
normative claim of the nl theory (whether classical or revisionist, old 
or new) is a strict reading of the principle of inviolability –as a principle 
protecting all conceptually defensible levels of (innocent) human life, 
including the non-conscious life of the cortically dead, the anencephalic, 
or the life of the embryo at its earliest stages– a definition such as the 
one indicated above is meant to fulfill this condition. As we shall see 
in section 5, however, other new nl theorists have preferred a “focal” 
definition of human life in terms of its fullest realization in mental and 
physical health and integrity. For reasons that we shall discuss in section 
5, however, this focal conception fails to support a strict reading of the 
principle of inviolability. Accordingly, I will provisionally assume that 
a biologically minimal definition of “human life” is preferable. 
The principle of inviolability has come under attack on several fronts 
over the past few decades, but most of these objections are silent on the 
strictly axiological question regarding the intrinsic value of human life. 
There is, for instance, the family of eminently pragmatic objections, 
such as the argument from Impracticality, which says that the prin-
ciple has to be rejected, “because it is too absolutist to deal with all the 
circumstances that can arise” (Singer 1994 192-193). The same is true of 
those indirect objections to the principle that arise from conceptions 
of self-determination or self-ownership quite extraneous to nl theory 
(a classic example is McCloskey 1975), and also of another family of 
objections that has tended to emphasize the inconsistencies in the nl 
tradition with regard to the application of the principle of inviolability 
(for example, why should capital punishment and killing in self-defense 
3 There have been philosophers that do not subscribe to Natural Law theory, but who 
nonetheless have argued in favour of the intrinsic goodness of human life. The most 
famous example perhaps is Ronald Dworkin (cf. 1993 ch. 3). Because Dworkin is 
looking for a consensus between liberals and conservatives, however, his argument 
seeks support for the claim that we all do, as a matter of fact, attribute intrinsic value 
to human life. As far as I know, only Natural Law theory h ilustrado as tried to show 
how the axiological principle can be justified.
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be allowed by the principle, as is traditionally argued by nl theorists?) 
–see for instance Devine 2000. Again, none of these objections directly 
confront the truth of the axiological claim. 
There is, however, one particular family of objections that directly 
challenges the axiological claim underlying the principle of inviola-
bility. I refer here to the family of objections based on Quality of Life 
Assessments. Various philosophers have argued, on similar grounds, 
that the worth of a particular human life is not automatically determined 
by its being a token of human life, but rather (within broad limits) by 
the person whose life is at stake. Jonathan Glover sets the agenda for 
Quality of Life theories when he claims that the view that being alive 
is intrinsically valuable:
[…] is a view that will seem unattractive to those of us who, in our 
own case, see a life of permanent coma as in no way preferable to death. 
From the subjective point of view, there is nothing to choose between 
the two. (45)
Glover argues, for instance, that a “permanently comatose existence 
is subjectively indistinguishable from death, and unlikely often to be 
thought intrinsically preferable to it by people thinking of their own 
future” (46). Accordingly, what is crucial for judging the value of a life, 
says Glover, is “how much the person himself gets out of life” (192), or 
as Peter Singer repeatedly claims, the question of whether life is worth 
living “from the inner perspective of the person” who leads or will lead 
that life (cf. Singer 1993 ch. 7).
Nonetheless, this sort of objection to the intrinsically valuable 
standing of human life has a fundamental dialectical drawback, in 
that it is based precisely on what the new nl theorist should deny, to 
wit, a subjective theory of value. Glover’s argument about the subjec-
tive indifference between permanently comatose existence and death 
is questionable from the new nl perspective because, as Mark Murphy 
observes, “on an objectivist account of goods, it is likely to be the case 
that there will be some situations in which the structure of preferences 
of actual agents will not mirror what there is reason to prefer” (Murphy 
104-105).4 And the case of people who are subjectively indifferent between 
a life of permanent coma and death might well be a non-mirroring case 
of this sort. 
What I intend to do in what follows is to confront the very axiologi-
cal claim behind the principle of inviolability in a genuinely dialectical 
fashion. I will therefore not start with a question-begging, subjective 
conception of value, but rather with one that is objective and relevantly 
4 See also Lee and George (2007 161-162).
[6 6]
departamento de filosofía • facultad de ciencias humanas • universidad nacional de colombia
Javier Echeñique
similar to the new nl theory. As a matter of fact, I will assume the 
truth of the new nl theory, except for the axiological claim, and ask the 
new nl theorist to show that the claim in question can be ultimately 
withheld within the new nl framework. The motivation behind this 
dialectical confrontation is the conviction that it is more effective than 
the Quality of Life approach, in terms of persuading the new nl theo-
rist of the groundlessness of the axiological claim, and ultimately, of 
its falsity –relative to the objective eudaimonistic framework that the 
new nl theorist is committed to accept. 
The Dialetics with the Suicidal Person
A good place to start discussing the view that life is a grounding 
basic human good, is by observing the following, quite natural objec-
tion; the objection of someone who considers his situation impossible 
to endure and whose intention is, consequently, to terminate his own 
life (this person shall be referred to as the “suicidal person”): “How can 
being alive be intrinsically good, if it can become so intolerable as to 
turn into something positively evil and impossible to endure?” 
To this sort of objection the new nl theorist is likely to reply that 
what is evil from the perspective of the suicidal person is not life itself, 
but rather defective conditions such as sickness, clinical depression, 
acute pain, poverty, solitude, friendlessness, and so on; added perhaps 
to the hopeless prospect of seeing an improvement in the foreseeable 
future (cf. Gómez-Lobo 11; Novak 50-51). These are all deficient condi-
tions that either straightforwardly amount to the lack of a basic good 
–we might call them “basic evils”– or that impede future participation in 
one or more of them –poverty being the clearest example. Accordingly, 
it is the troubled existence consisting of the lack of one or more of the 
undisputed basic goods, rather than life itself, what misleadingly makes 
life itself seem like something positively evil and not worth participat-
ing in anymore.
Now, even though this sort of response to the objection of the sui-
cidal person seems to dispel our initial worries concerning the intrinsic 
goodness of being alive, it also seems to open a conceptual space for a 
much more serious concern, for the response leaves any axiology that 
regards human life as something intrinsically neutral or indifferent 
wholly unscathed. 
We can give more substance to this new concern as follows. That life 
itself cannot be a constitutive ingredient of happiness (nor therefore an 
intrinsic or basic good), was clearly recognized by Aristotle, particularly 
in Book i of the Eudemian Ethics, where he first urged us to distinguish 
the question “What does our living well consist of?” from the question 
“What are the indispensable conditions of our living well?”. Aristotle 
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believes that failure to distinguish these two questions is the cause of 
much confusion in ethical inquiry: “some people regard the things that 
are indispensable conditions of being happy as actual parts of happi-
ness” (1214b27-28).5 How can we distinguish the merely indispensable 
(and thus only instrumentally desirable) conditions of happiness from 
its constitutive parts? An initial suggestion that Aristotle endorses in the 
same book (cf. 1215b15-1216a23) is the following. Any genuine candidate 
for a constituent of happiness x –and thus for the title of “basic good”– 
should at least be able to answer the question: “Is x such that any adult, 
rational human being would choose to be alive, in order to possess or 
enjoy x, over non-existence?” Evidently, the very framing of the ques-
tion itself precludes the following answer: “to be alive” (to zên) –for the 
question is, precisely, what makes being alive more preferable than not 
being alive. For Aristotle, being alive is rather a mere condition sine qua 
non of happiness: “without breathing or being awake or participating in 
movement we could not possess any good or any evil at all” (1214b20-22, 
emphasis added). Notice that Aristotle is also indicating a further reason 
why being alive cannot be a constituent of happiness: being alive is also 
the condition for the possession of evils –but presumably no intrinsic 
good can also be a constitutive part of an intrinsic evil. This point will 
be important in the following sections. 
It is not clear whether Aristotle thinks only genuine intrinsic goods 
(as opposed to genuine candidates) can give a correct answer to the afore-
mentioned question, but he evidently thinks that all genuine intrinsic 
goods –such as virtuous activity, honours, virtuous friendship, genuine 
pleasure or theoretical understanding– should at least be able to answer 
it. Aristotle, however, does not mention “being alive” as one of these 
goods. Accordingly, we have at our disposal an axiology that considers 
being alive as something that is neither good nor bad in itself, but that 
can be made good or bad by the immediate presence of intrinsically 
good or bad items respectively, and perhaps also by the mere possibility 
of these items. This is not an axiology of the sort that is propounded by 
Quality of Life theorists, where a life’s worth is primarily determined 
by the subjective preferences of the person whose life is at stake. On 
the contrary, this is an objective theory relevantly similar to the new 
nl theory, except that it does not regard life as an intrinsic good –the 
reader might even prefer to consider a slightly modified version of the 
Aristotelian axiology that includes all the basic goods standardly rec-
ognized by new nl theorists, except life: health, knowledge, friendship, 
work and play, or the appreciation of beauty.6
5 All the quotations from Aristotle’s Eudemian Ethics are taken from Rackham’s 
translation.
6 For a survey of the various lists offered by new NL theorists, see Oderberg 2007. 
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Consequently, assuming that the reply offered by the new nl theo-
rist to the suicidal person is basically correct and what is bad in the life 
of the suicidal person is the mere lack of one or more undisputed basic 
human goods, this reply does not impugn the view of the illustrated 
suicidal person, now equipped with an Aristotelian axiology: because 
his life is devoid of the undisputed basic human goods, his life is not 
worth living –precisely because life, in itself axiologically indifferent, has 
a derivative value (in the broad sense of “value”), and in this particular 
case, a negative value derived from the lack of one or more undisputed 
basic human goods. 
The obvious conclusion to draw from this dialogue between the 
suicidal person and the new nl ethicist, is that the axiological claim 
needs to be argued for. I will begin with an argument that could be 
interpreted as addressing this impasse between the new nl theorists 
and our illustrated suicidal person.
The Argument of Inclinationism and Intelligibility
Most philosophers working in this tradition want to say, in line 
with Thomas Aquinas, that all those things towards which the human 
being has a natural inclination are naturally and non-inferentially 
apprehended as good by practical intelligence, as ends-to-be-pursued 
by action.7  In the case of human life, for example, “life itself” (ipsa vita) 
is something which “we naturally desire” (Summa Theologiae i.2, q.5, 
a.3). Now, if the object of the inclination one experiences is grasped as 
a form of the good “by a simple act of non-inferential understanding” 
(Finnis 1980 34), it follows that “life is naturally understood as a good 
to be preserved” (Grisez 1983 180).
It should be noted that these ideas have not, to my knowledge, been 
explicitly presented as an argument in favour of the inherently valua-
ble standing of human life. Still, it is worth noticing that it will not 
suffice to reply to our suicidal person (now armed with an axiology à 
la Aristotle): “The natural inclination to preserve your life is naturally 
present in you, but given that your practical reason is not in good or-
der, you will have difficulty recognizing human life as a basic good at 
all, and therefore the categorical prescription to maintain yourself in 
being. That is why you deny the intrinsically valuable standing of hu-
man life. If your practical reason was in good order, on the other hand, 
you would not circumvent the natural inclination already present in 
you by giving precedence to the avoidance of suffering or any other 
subjectively intolerable circumstance over the inclination to continue 
in life, because you would immediately grasp its intrinsically valuable 
7 For an interpretation of Aquinas’ view, see Finnis (1980 34) and Murphy (6-17).
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standing”. This sort of argument is not dialectically legitimate, because 
it merely assumes the view that the illustrated suicidal person wants to 
deny, given his own experience of things and armed with an Aristotelian 
axiology as he might be; namely, that there is such a thing as a natural 
inclination to preserve one’s life in the first place or, alternatively, that 
the object of such an inclination is intrinsically good8.
Perhaps because of the difficulties in rendering Inclinationism 
palatable to the modern mind, many new nl theorists have preferred 
an alternative way of capturing the inclinationist intuition, by appea-
ling to the notion of practical intelligibility. According to this view, 
basic goods are not only items we have a natural tendency to pursue 
but more fundamentally perhaps, they are items that provide actions 
within that tendency with practical intelligibility. According to this 
view, x is a human good if (and only if) the mere fact of pursuing, pro-
tecting or promoting x can be cited as an ultimate reason for a course of 
intentional action, or alternatively, if x makes our actions immediately 
intelligible from the practical point of view, without having to appeal to 
the pursuit or avoidance of a further item y. And this of course applies 
to human life: “when one acts in order to preserve or protect one’s life, 
that action may be immediately intelligible.” (Murphy 101).
Now, the notion of immediate (because non-derivative or ultimate) 
practical intelligibility might initially appear as the ordinary notion of 
a practical reason that confers immediate intelligibility upon an ac-
tion from the internal perspective of the agent, and new nl theorists 
often write as if immediate practical intelligibility consisted merely in 
this ordinary notion. Someone who stabs his leg with a fork at regular 
intervals and has no reason for doing so, fails to confer intelligibility 
(immediate or not) upon his action in the ordinary sense that “we cannot 
understand what the agent is up to, we cannot see a point to his actions” 
(Murphy 2). Moreover, even if the man in the example had replied, à 
la Davidson, “I want to give the impression that I am mentally insane, 
and I believe that by stabbing my leg in this fashion I will achieve this”, 
we do not have to move from his internal perspective in order to judge 
that he has failed to meet the ultimacy or immediacy condition: he is 
rationalizing his action, but we still want to know why he wants to give 
the impression that he is mentally insane. Nonetheless, despite appea-
rances to the contrary, the concept of immediate intelligibility employed 
by new nl theorists is not the ordinary, unproblematic concept that we 
characteristically presume to be present in those actions ultimately or 
immediately rationalized by the agent’s beliefs and pro-attitudes.
8 I have been greatly assisted by David Novak’s account of Summa Theologiae II.2, q.65, 
a.5, in Novak chapter 3.
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Suppose the man in our example does provide such an ultimate 
reason: “I want to be sent to a mental institute so that I don’t have to 
work anymore; I just don’t like working”. Even if, from the perspective 
of the agent, we have reached rock bottom in the chain of rationali-
zations, the new nl theorist is likely to point out that this ultimate 
rationalization fails to make the self-stabbing behaviour immediately 
intelligible. Although the action has been ultimately referred to some 
item x (i. e. idleness) that is not in fact desired by the agent himself in 
virtue of some further item, this item x that he is ultimately pursuing 
is not intrinsically worth pursuing or desirable (cf. Chappell 33-36). The 
concept of practical intelligibility or desirability as used by the new nl 
theorist is a substantive normative concept: it applies to things that are 
worth desiring, to things that are rational to desire in a substantive sen-
se of “rational”. And if pressed to provide content to this latter claim, 
the new nl theorist will undoubtedly have recourse to the requirement 
that the immediate intelligibility-conferring reason be a genuine aspect 
of human well-being, understood as an objectively ascertainable state 
of human beings. As new nl theorists put it, “desires and preferences 
are rational only if they are in line with what is genuinely good, that 
is, genuinely fulfilling.” (Lee and George 2008 180). And only referen-
ce to a basic human good (but certainly not to idleness) will fulfil this 
substantive requirement of practical intelligibility. 
In light of the identity between intelligibility-conferring reasons 
and integral aspects of human well-being held by new nl theorists, 
this result should not perhaps be unexpected; but it does show that the 
dialectical pressure is now on the claim that human life is an integral 
aspect of human well-being. We shall concentrate on this latter claim 
in the following sections, but before that I would like to draw attention 
to the difficulties involved in the appeal to evidence to the effect that the 
preservation or protection of mere human life may immediately confer 
intelligibility on actions allegedly aiming at it.9 An appeal to eviden-
ce of this sort may seem like an attractive manoeuvre at this juncture. 
Joseph Boyle, for instance, argues as follows:
Family members and health-care workers have chosen to give life-pre-
serving care to persons they knew to be in irreversible coma. Not everyone 
would make such a choice or consider it correct. But the fact that some 
have made it gives evidence that life is a basic good –one which offers for 
choice an intelligible ground which need have no ulterior ground. (238-239)
9 John Finnis claims that, based on “the evidence of (inter alia) empirical anthropology”, 
his book Natural Law and Natural Reason “offered a list of basic reasons for willing 
(intelligent wanting) and doing” (cf. 2011 28).
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Assuming that this is all the evidence at our disposal, Boyle’s example 
is far from supporting the claim that human life is per se an intelligi-
bility-conferring reason. It does not tell us whether these health-care 
workers and family members have freely chosen to give life-preserving 
care to patients in a comatose state instead of having been coerced by 
the law or different forms of social pressure to do so –in which case, 
their life-preserving care would not be immediately intelligible. Neither 
does it tell us whether, because of their empirical knowledge that the 
coma was irreversible, these people had absolutely no faith or hope that 
the comatose patient could perhaps be an exception to the rule and 
eventually recover, or that a miracle could happen –in which case the 
remote possibility that the patient could eventually come to participate 
in the undisputed basic goods could be what ultimately informs their 
life-preserving decisions. 
But more importantly, even if we had further evidence and knew, 
for instance, these people’s own sincere description of their ultimate 
reasons in terms of mere life-preservation, their ultimate reasons might 
“not mirror what there is reason to prefer”, as the new nl theorist must 
recognize. There are also people who choose to terminate their own lives, 
or the lives of those they know to be in irreversible coma, because they 
consider these lives worthless or positively bad, and who would regard 
this sort of consideration as conferring immediate intelligibility upon 
their choice. Nothing in the ordinary sense of “intelligible” prevents 
them from doing so. No doubt the new nl theorist would argue that, 
unlike these latter cases, in those cases where the mere preservation or 
protection of human life is seen as the final aim, the agent’s subjective 
preferences are not likely to be mistaken: life is a basic good, an integral 
aspect of human well-being. But then this is precisely the claim under 
dispute. Therefore, we should see if at this juncture the new nl theorist 
can have recourse to it. 
The Arguments of Well-being
There is indeed a family of arguments specifically designed to sup-
port the claim that being alive has an intrinsically valuable standing. 
Indeed, as far as I can see, the family of arguments discussed in this 
and the next section are the only ones available in the literature that 
are explicitly and directly aimed at supporting the axiological claim.
In its clearest version (cf. Gómez-Lobo 12), the basic argument is 
based on what I shall call the “Principle of the Intrinsic Goodness of 
Parts” (or pigp for short):
pigp: For any composite thing or state c, if c is intrinsically good, the 
constituent elements of c must themselves be intrinsically good. 
[72]
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Relying on this principle, the argument goes as follows: 
i) We all agree that happiness (well-being or the good life) is a com-
posite condition, and one that is intrinsically good; indeed, it is the 
intrinsic good par excellence. 
ii) Being alive is a constitutive element of happiness (or well-being, etc.) 
iii) pigp.
Ergo: Being alive is intrinsically good. 
I do not think this argument works. To see this, let us assume the 
following, equally compelling principle –which I shall call the “Principle 
of the Intrinsic Badness of Parts” (or pibp for short):  
pibp: For any composite thing or state c, if c is intrinsically bad, the 
constituent elements of c must themselves be intrinsically bad. 
Relying on this principle, the parallel argument goes like this: 
i’) We all agree that human misery, defined as the total absence of 
the basic goods (except for life), is something intrinsically bad par 
excellence, something that is per se an object of our repulsion, etc. 
ii’) Life is a constitutive element of our misery, ‘misery’ is just a life full 
of misery. 
iii’) pibp. 
Ergo’: Life is intrinsically bad.
Now, what is crucial about there being these two antithetical argu-
ments can be shown by the following reasoning:
1. The two conclusions, firstly that human life is intrinsically good 
and secondly that human life is intrinsically evil, cannot both be 
true in the same sense. 
2. The premises in both arguments stand and fall together, and so it 
cannot be the case that one conclusion is true and the other false. 
Let us elaborate on this point. 
For example, premises (i) and (i’), stating that there are composite 
conditions that we call “happiness” and “misery” that are intrinsically 
good and bad respectively, stand and fall together. Anyone who wishes to 
maintain (i) must maintain (i’), since human misery is just the absence 
of human happiness. Some new nl ethicists might feel tempted to deny 
the existence of human misery, because they follow Aquinas in claim-
ing that evil or badness is mere privation. As Murphy says: “Badness 
is not a positive entity but, rather, a lack.” (Murphy 97). So if human 
misery is the total lack or privation of the basic goods (except for life), 
then it is even clearer that human misery is not a positive entity. But 
why should this be a problem for my argument? After all, the claim that 
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human misery is not a “positive entity”, whatever that phrase means, 
does not mean that human misery is not an entity, that it does not exist. 
All that my argument requires is that there be some state or condition 
that can be adequately described as “human misery”and this, I think, 
is undeniable.
Premises (ii) and (ii’), stating that life is a constitutive element of 
happiness and misery respectively, also stand and fall together. If you 
wish to maintain that life is a constitutive element of happiness (e. g. 
the good of life “is life fully realized” –Gomez-Lobo 12–), you must also 
maintain that life is a constitutive element of misery (e. g. a miserable 
life is an unrealized life) on pain of inconsistency –assuming both (i) 
and (i’), of course: if the new nl theorist affirms (ii) while denying (ii’), 
then he is committed to denying the very possibility of human misery, 
i. e. (i’), which is absurd. 
Finally, premises (iii) and (iii’), that is pigp and pibp, also stand and 
fall together. Evidently, if one assumes that pigp is true, this is because 
one believes that this principle is an instance of a more general prin-
ciple about intrinsic value that applies to both intrinsic goodness and 
intrinsic badness. Of course, you might want to deny both –perhaps, 
because they both commit the Fallacy of Division10– and if this is so, 
then all the better for my case. At any rate, I will proceed dialectically 
under the assumption that pigp is true and that the new nl theorist is 
thereby committed to maintain the truth of pibp as well. 
Ergo: (from (1) and (2)), the only alternative is that both conclu-
sions are false –because they both find themselves based on parallel 
false premises. Consequently, it is false that life is intrinsically good. 
We can move a step further, both in the direction of reinforcing 
this argument and in the direction of finding the truth, if we try to 
identify the false premises in virtue of which both conclusions turn 
out to be false. Premises (i) and (i’) are perfectly true and undeniable, 
at least both from the standpoint of Aristotelian axiology and from the 
standpoint of nl theory. Premises (iii) and (iii’) seem true, and, in any 
case they are dialectically sound. Therefore, the false premises must be 
(ii) and (ii’), that is, the assumptions that life is a constitutive element of 
the composite intrinsic good of happiness and of the composite intrinsic 
evil of misery respectively. Indeed, as we shall see in section vi,11 there 
are very good independent reasons to think that these two premises, 
(ii) and (ii’), must be false and that, accordingly, human life cannot be 
a constitutive element of happiness –nor of misery, of course.
10 So suppose I claim that knowledge is intrinsically good. PIGP would mean that cons-
tituent elements of knowledge, such as belief, truth and justification, are intrinsically 
good, which seems false, at least in the case of belief.
11 “Human life as a peculiar sort of instrumentally valuable condition”.
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Note that the difficulty here is not, as in the previous section, that 
the new nl theorist is simply assuming that life is an intrinsic good, for 
he is not doing this: he is rather assuming that life is a constitutive ingre-
dient of a composite intrinsic good such as happiness, and employing 
this assumption to show that life is also an intrinsic good. The difficulty 
is similar to the one presented in the previous section, however, in that 
in both cases new nl ethicists are assuming something that the suicidal 
person, armed with an Aristotelian axiology, is not committed to admit. 
It is worth noting that the same objection developed in the previ-
ous paragraphs is pertinent to other arguments relevantly similar to 
the one offered by Gómez-Lobo. The following is the version of David 
Oderberg. To make a case for the parallel antithetical argument I have 
inserted the relevant concepts in brackets: 
[…] all of the basic human goods [evils] are ultimately pursued [avoi-
ded] for their own sakes, because together they make up human happiness 
[misery]: human happiness [misery] is not something over and above the 
goods [evils], but is a complex condition made of those goods [evils]. Since 
the pursuit [avoidance] of any of those goods [evils] cannot be separated 
in thought from the idea of life itself –every pursuit [avoidance] of a good 
[an evil] being a pursuit [an avoidance] of a living human being– life is 
itself necessarily pursued [avoided] for its own sake, as a constituent of 
happiness [misery], along with every other good [evil]. Why do I pursue 
knowledge [avoid ignorance]? For its own sake, since it is part of what 
fulfils a human being [what makes a human being miserable] to know 
[not to know] about the world around them. But what pursues knowledge 
[avoids ignorance] is me, a living human being. So my life itself, which 
is conceptually inseparable from the pursuit of knowledge [avoidance of 
ignorance], must also be pursued [avoided] as an ultimate constituent of 
human fulfilment [misery], moreover as the basic precondition of fulfil-
ment [misery]. (Oderberg 2000a 142)12
In the version offered by Oderberg, the axiological claim is achieved 
by arguing, not that life is conceptually inseparable from the good life 
or living-well (as in Gómez-Lobo), but rather by arguing that life itself 
is conceptually inseparable from the pursuit of any of the other goods 
that constitute the good life or living-well. But the same objection as 
before is equally pertinent to the latter argument, as made clear by the 
concepts in closed brackets above: life is also conceptually inseparable 
from the avoidance of intrinsic evils, and so life itself must also be 
avoided as an ultimate constituent of human misery. Once more, we 
arrive at two mutually incompatible conclusions, and as I have argued, 
12 For another version see Lee and George (2007 160-161).
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we are rationally compelled, not only to abandon the view that human 
life has intrinsic value, but also the underlying view that human life is 
inseparable (conceptually or otherwise) from the pursuit of the other, 
undisputed basic goods –and from the avoidance of intrinsic evils. 
The Argument of Health
It is worth considering another argument that can be seen perhaps 
as a particular version of the view that human life is inseparable from 
the pursuit of any of the undisputed basic goods. According to this 
argument, human life, in its fullest realization at least, is particularly 
inseparable from the intrinsic good of health. This is Mark C. Murphy’s 
argument, and it deserves to be discussed in its own terms. The follow-
ing is my reconstruction of it.
First, (1) suppose we assume the following characterization of 
the good of life as “the proper functioning of humans qua animate 
beings” (Murphy 101).13 In particular, participation in this good “does 
not consist only in bare survival but also in overall physical integrity 
and health” (ibd.).
Next (2), suppose we claim that human life in its full realization, 
that is, participation in overall physical integrity and health (including 
mental health) is an intrinsic good. For instance, Murphy believes that 
someone who possesses life alone in its full realization but is defective 
in the rest of the basic goods (knowledge, friendship, etc.) is obviously 
better off than not being alive.
And finally, (3) let us assume the following principle: “If there is 
some state of affairs the intrinsic goodness of which is constituted by 
its exhibiting feature(s) f to some degree, then any state of affairs that 
exhibits feature(s) f to some degree will be to some extent intrinsi-
cally good” (Murphy 104). And assume that the feature f in question is 
physical and mental health and integrity, and the degree to which this 
feature is exhibited by a human life (the “state of affairs” in this case) 
in order for it to be undeniably an intrinsic good, is an optimal level of 
physical and mental health and integrity. 
According to Murphy, it follows from (1), (2) and (3) that “life is, at 
whatever level of vitality, a basic good” (102).
As I see it, the difficulty with Murphy’s argument is that the principle 
in (3) depends on a questionable interpretation of the phrase “exhibit-
ing feature(s) f to some degree”. Succinctly put, the interpretation is 
too permissive. 
13 See also Finnis’ definition of “human life” as “every aspect of the vitality (vita, life) which 
puts a human being in good shape for self-determination. Hence, life here includes 
bodily (including cerebral) health, and freedom from the pain that betokens organic 
malfunctioning or injury” (Finnis 1980 86).
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Suppose I claim that the intrinsic good involved in knowing how 
to read German is of a gradual nature. I am being too permissive if I 
take this gradual nature to entail that reading German extremely badly 
exemplifies knowing how to read German “to a certain degree”, for it 
may be the case that a) this knowledge is so defective that it does not 
even make sense to describe it as “reading German”, or alternatively, 
b) so defective that it is contradictory to say that deficiently knowing 
how to read German is a good. On the other hand, I am being reason-
ably strict if I do not take this gradual nature to entail either a) or b). 
In this same vein, I am being too permissive if I take the gradual 
nature of physical and mental health and integrity to entail a) that sever-
ally diseased and infirm human organisms exhibit health and integrity 
to a certain degree (i. e. to a “lesser degree”), or b) that it makes good 
sense to say that severely diseased and infirm human organisms are 
functioning well, instead of badly. Only this over-permissive reading 
allows Murphy to conclude that human life is a good at any level of 
vitality, including severely diseased and defective human beings. The 
more strict and plausible reading of the phrase ‘exhibiting feature(s) f 
to some degree’ in the principle in (3) does not entail either a) or b): it 
should only entail that all degrees of human life that fall short of its full 
realization, without yet being positively deficient, are good (e. g. the life 
of the healthy foetus, for instance).
Murphy might well argue, as a rejoinder to this objection, that in 
cases of extreme disease and infirmity what exhibits health and integ-
rity is the vital functioning that is keeping the human organism alive 
and that must be underway even when disease and defect is present in 
the rest of the organism, because this vital functioning does exhibit 
proper functioning. No matter how defectively a human organism as 
a whole might be functioning, if that organism is still alive there must 
be some vital function of that organism that is working properly. I 
am not denying this, of course. But from this rejoinder Murphy can-
not conclude that the whole severely defective or infirm living human 
organism exhibits the intrinsic good of health and integrity to some 
degree and is itself intrinsically good. Admittedly, from the fact that 
a person knows only a bit of German it is possible to conclude that he 
exhibits, qua knower, the good of knowledge to some degree; but no 
one would say that due to this poor knowledge he is a good knower, 
for he also exhibits, to a greater extent, the evil of ignorance. It seems 
more reasonable to think that such a person is still a bad knower, and 
concede that there is a portion of what makes him a good knower that 
is “realized” in him. In the same vein, Murphy is merely authorized to 
conclude that, in severely diseased and infirm human organisms, what 
exhibits the intrinsic good of health and is itself intrinsically good is the 
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life of that healthy organ or function that is still underway, as opposed 
to the whole human organism, which exhibits disease and infirmity, as 
we are now assuming, to a greater extent. 
When Murphy concludes that human life is a basic good at any level 
of “vitality”, he seems to take both “vitality” and “health” (or “proper 
functioning”) as standing indistinctly for the feature f in question –
relying perhaps on a certain ambiguity affecting the term “vitality”, 
which can mean “the property of being alive” as well as “the property 
of being healthy”. As is clear from (1) and (2), however, feature f in the 
case of human life is physical and mental health and integrity –human 
life being the “state of affairs” mentioned in (3). And what the strict 
understanding of the gradual nature of health shows, is that health 
(as distinct from life and “vitality” in this sense), at whatever level, is a 
good. But this is not under dispute. 
Furthermore, a comparably significant result of the previous con-
siderations is that health and life must be kept separate. The opposite 
of health is disease, and you exhibit health or proper functioning to 
the extent to which you are not diseased or defective, and this comes in 
degrees. The opposite of life, however, is not disease but death, and in 
this sense you exhibit life to the extent to which you are not dead, and 
this does not come in degrees. For these reasons, I think, a biologically 
minimal definition of human life such as that of Gómez-Lobo is prefer-
able, and so too is it preferable to count health as a good that is distinct 
from life, as several new nl theorists actually do. 
Human Life as a Peculiar Sort of Instrumentally  
Valuable Condition
I have argued that, if both happiness and misery are intrinsically 
valuable composites –in the broad sense of “valuable” that includes 
disvalue, and this I shall assume from now on– and any constitutive 
element of an intrinsically valuable composite is itself intrinsically 
valuable, human life cannot be a constitutive element of happiness: 
otherwise human life would also have to be a constitutive element 
of misery, and it would be both intrinsically good and bad, which is 
impossible. Since being a constitutive element of human flourishing 
or happiness is what makes an item intrinsically or “basically” good, it 
follows from this wider eudaimonistic setting that human life cannot 
be intrinsically good in this sense. 
 On the other hand, many new nl theorists feel that an instrumen-
tality view of the value of human life is unviable, because the good life, 
quite obviously, cannot be a product or a consequence of life, nor can it 
be instrumental in the way my shoes are instrumental for walking or 
money instrumental for buying things. Surely, they think, the relation-
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ship between human life and the good life must be more intimate, must 
be constitutive. What I wish to do in this section is to show that life 
might well be a truly peculiar kind of instrumentally valuable condition 
of human happiness or well-being. This peculiarity might well account 
for the initial appeal of the idea that life is a constitutive part of happi-
ness, while showing at the same time why this idea cannot be correct. 
It is widely thought that c is an instrumentally valuable condition 
of goal g if c is valuable for its causal properties contributing to the 
attainment of g. For instance, I want private wealth because it offers me 
the resources to acquire theoretical knowledge. Without the economic 
stability that private wealth offers me, as things stand, I would not be 
able to participate in the good of theoretical knowledge. Nonetheless, 
if I could secure these results by other means (c2 or c3), these other 
means would be just as good. For instance, if I could secure theoretical 
knowledge by the economic stability that state funding offers me, state 
funding would be just as good as private wealth in this regard. So far so 
good. But now notice that both private wealth and state funding are valu-
able because they offer me economic stability, which in turn is valuable 
because it releases me from the anxiety involved in constantly searching 
for the means of sustaining myself (or my family) and provides me with 
spare time to pursue theoretical knowledge. Both mental tranquillity 
and spare time are instrumentally valuable conditions of the pursuit of 
theoretical knowledge. And now, given that I want economic stability 
because, as things stand, it releases me from mental anxiety and offers 
me spare time, we can apply the same sort of conditional criterion to 
economic stability itself. If I could secure mental tranquillity and spare 
time, and ultimately theoretical knowledge, by means other than eco-
nomic stability, these other means would be just as good. 
Notice that the closer these means are to the final goal (in our case, 
theoretical knowledge), the more difficult it is to apply the conditional 
criterion to the means. Suppose the application of the conditional 
criterion to economic stability in our example does make sense. For 
instance, we can conceive a completely different system for managing 
the resources of planet earth, a system in which there is nothing we 
could recognize as “economic” stability, but where we human beings 
can still achieve some sort of stability that releases us from anxiety 
and offers us spare time to pursue the good of theoretical knowledge. 
Now, we may genuinely wonder if the conditional criterion can now 
be sensibly applied to mental tranquillity and spare time themselves. 
Could it be possible to secure and participate in the good of theoretical 
knowledge without mental tranquillity and spare time? Well, as far as 
my knowledge of the workings of human life on earth and the laws that 
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govern such life goes (nomologically14 speaking, that is), it is clear that 
the answer is no. Even though mental tranquillity and spare time are 
instrumentally valuable conditions, they seem to be indispensable con-
ditions as well, at least in this sense. But mental tranquillity and spare 
time are clearly not constitutive ingredients of theoretical knowledge. 
In fact, if they were, they would also have to be constitutive ingredients 
of the indifference to, and lack of concern for, theoretical knowledge 
that characterizes theoretical ignorance under these conditions. How 
can we explain then this axiological peculiarity of mental anxiety and 
spare time in our example? What occurs, I think, is that even though 
these conditions are instrumentally valuable, they are conditions of 
such a kind, so closely related “nomologically” speaking to the goal of 
theoretical knowledge that, as far as my knowledge of the workings of 
human life on earth and the laws that govern such life goes, I could not 
secure such a goal by other means.
Let us call these nomologically irreplaceable, instrumentally valu-
able conditions, such as tranquillity and spare time in our example, 
“irreplaceable instrumentally valuable” conditions or “iiv” conditions 
for short. Notice that precisely because these conditions such as tran-
quillity and spare time are obviously not instrumentally related to the 
goal of theoretical knowledge in the way more remote conditions such 
as wealth or economic stability are, one might be strongly tempted 
to consider them as constitutive ingredients of the goal of theoretical 
knowledge. That is to say, there is an important sense in which it is sense-
less or absurd to ask about them –as it is not with regard to remote and 
dispensable conditions– whether other instrumental conditions with 
relevantly similar causal properties could replace them, and so whether 
these other instrumental conditions would be just as good –or just as 
“bad” for that matter. 
The point of this whole disquisition is that the relationship between 
human life and happiness seems to be precisely like that which exists 
between mental tranquillity or spare time on the one hand, and the 
cultivation of theoretical knowledge on the other. Being alive (and not 
only in its biologically minimal expression, as we shall see) could be an 
“iiv condition” of happiness. Being alive is clearly not like money from 
the axiological point of view, in the sense that, given our knowledge of 
the actual world and the laws governing it, it is simply not possible to 
promote the intrinsic goods that constitute the whole of happiness by 
means other than being alive –these are the only means we know and 
can make sense of. 
14 I use the term “nomological” to refer to something that is made not only true, but also 
intelligible or graspable because of the way the natural world is constituted.
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Of course, one could in principle conceive a supernatural condi-
tion in which I do not need the operation of my vital organs in order 
to function as a conscious being or participate in the undisputed basic 
goods –a supernatural condition that would then be “just as good”. 
Still, the mere conceivability of such a supernatural condition does not 
impugn the thought that, given our present knowledge of the world, 
such a condition is not possible for human beings made out of flesh and 
bones living on planet earth.
The assumption that being alive is an instrumentally valuable con-
dition of happiness satisfactorily explains, I contend, why it can also 
be an instrumentally valuable condition of its opposite, misery, pretty 
much in the same way that mental tranquillity and spare time can also 
be instrumental conditions of genuine indifference to, and lack of con-
cern for, theoretical knowledge. Nonetheless, being alive also has the 
peculiarity of being an iiv condition of happiness, and this explains 
in turn why it might be tempting to think that it is not instrumentally 
related to happiness at all. Since it is not instrumentally related to it in 
the way more remote and dispensable conditions are, one might think, 
particularly if one has not noticed the existence of iiv conditions, that 
it is not instrumentally related to happiness at all. 
Perhaps because new nl theorists have failed to notice the pecu-
liarity of these instrumental conditions, we can say, with Aristotle, that 
they are among those people who wrongly “regard the things that are 
indispensable conditions of being happy as actual parts of happiness” 
(1214b27-28). Possibly what makes being alive seem like a constitutive 
ingredient of living-well is that, as Gómez-Lobo says, “life is not exter-
nal or instrumental to the good life. The good life is not a product or a 
consequence of life.” (Gómez-Lobo 12). In a sense, this claim is correct. 
The good life or happiness cannot be the “product” or “consequence” of 
life, in the way my participation in the good of theoretical knowledge is 
an extrinsic product of my investing money in education. Again, Joseph 
Boyle says that human life “seems to be an element of the human being’s 
full-being. It certainly is not extrinsic and instrumental as are the pos-
sessions persons use” (Boyle 237). And once more, I think that this is 
correct: human life is not as instrumental as are the possessions people 
use. The assumption that these authors seem to make is that, from the 
instrumentality point of view, the relationship between human life and 
well-being must be like that which exists between private wealth and the 
cultivation of theoretical knowledge. Because this seems patently false, 
it is assumed that the instrumentality view cannot be true. Nonetheless, 
the view that human life is an iiv condition clearly shows how human 
life can be instrumentally valuable, without being instrumentally valu-
able in the way the possessions persons use. 
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Accordingly, not only is the new nl theorist rationally compelled 
to accept that human life cannot be intrinsically or “basically” good, 
he also has no plausible grounds for rejecting the only objective view of 
the value of human life that can account for the fact that human life is 
both a condition of human flourishing as well as a condition of human 
misery, namely, the instrumentality view that I have presented here. If 
human life were not instrumentally related to well-being, it would not 
be instrumentally related to misery either –it would be an intrinsic part 
of misery, and so on and so forth.
The Indirect Argument of Dualism
Grisez and Boyle (1979) propose an indirect argument in support of 
the inherently valuable standing of human life. The argument is inten-
ded to show that the alternative position, according to which human life 
is merely instrumental in value, has highly untenable implications. In 
particular, these philosophers argue that the instrumentality view “im-
plies that the human person or some parts of the human person are one 
thing and that a person’s living body is quite another thing” (Grisez and 
Boyle 370, emphasis added). They argue that this implication amounts 
to dualism, and since dualism is obviously false, by implication so is 
the instrumentality view. 
Now, the instrumentality view, as I have presented it at least, is not 
that human life is instrumental to, and thus not a constituent of, the 
human person. The view is rather that human life is instrumental to 
happiness, well-being or the good life. Nor should the instrumentality 
view hold that human life is a “thing”, that is, a substance or entity such 
as a living body. Accordingly, for their argument to work, Grisez and 
Boyle need to identify (as they do in fact) the well-being of a human 
person with the human person, or at least with a fundamental part of 
the human person –“that part of the person which the person realizes 
by his or her own choices and actions” (376). And they also need to iden-
tify human life with the human body, which they regard as a merely 
extrinsic aspect of the human person. Exactly the same manoeuvre is 
made by other new nl theorists who employ the indirect argument of 
dualism (cf. Paterson 51; Lee and George 2007 161). Once they have made 
this move, these authors can claim that the instrumentalist position is 
committed to dualism, since the distinction between the human per-
son and his living body “must be a distinction between two entities” 
(Grisez and Boyle 376).
Now, it is plain to see that the instrumentalist position is neither 
committed to identifying happiness with the human person, nor to 
identifying human life with the living body. I think that it can be plau-
sibly demonstrated that these two identity-claims are false. Let us first 
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consider human flourishing or happiness. It might be correct to say that 
human flourishing is an “aspect” of some persons or human beings, 
namely, those that are living well or flourishing. But clearly, human 
flourishing is not an aspect of all persons or human beings, because not 
all human beings are flourishing. Furthermore, and more importantly: 
even if, per impossibile, all human beings were flourishing, I cannot see 
why the instrumentality view should be committed to the admittedly 
absurd claim that human flourishing is an “entity” or “substance” –as 
distinct from an activity, for instance. And finally, the instrumenta-
lity view is obviously not committed to claiming that human life is to 
be identified with the living human body, as opposed to the set of ca-
pacities or functions that pertain to a human body, in virtue of which 
a body is alive –that is, able to perform these functions and exercise 
these capacities. I do not see therefore why every instrumentalist view 
should be committed to some sort of “substance dualism” about living 
human beings or persons.15
The second and more crucial point I wish to make concerns the 
particular reasons underpinning the nl theorist’s conviction that “[t]
he dualism to which an instrumentalist view of life inevitably leads 
is false” (Grisez and Boyle 377). Grisez and Boyle’s main argument in 
support of this judgement is particularly eloquent: 
[L]ife is not merely one process among others, which might be distin-
guished from breathing, feeling pain, choosing, talking, and administering 
treatments. The life of a living entity is indistinguishable from the very 
reality of the entity –a reality which pervades and includes all that the 
entity does. Breathing, feeling pain, choosing, talking, and administe-
ring treatments can all be enlivened and real by one and the same life of 
one single individual, and all these activities are parts of the individual’s 
whole life process. For any organism to exist is for it to live, and all of 
its activities are part of its life. The same is true for human individuals.
Thus, human activities, including those which seem most distinc-
tively personal, those which no one denies to be intrinsic constituents 
of human flourishing, are not separate from a person’s life. Life is not a 
characteristic of one part of a whole, and these activities properties of 
some other part of it. Rather, life pervades these activities […] (377-378)
15 Surely these authors are thinking of views such as Singer’s or those defended by the 
advocates of neocortical death, which are based on Lockean anthropology (where the 
holder of rights and value is the person, defined by the capacities for self-consciousness 
required by imputability, and therefore distinct from the living body), and there is 
indeed a case for the view that Lockean anthropology is dualistic (cf. Schumacher 2010 
25). Nonetheless, it is not essential to instrumentalist views about the value of human 
life to be based on Lockean anthropology.
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By now this line of reasoning should be familiar, and so should be 
our objection to it as detailed in the previous sections. Yes, life “pervades” 
all the activities that are un-controversially part of the flourishing of a 
human person. Nonetheless, the view that human life is an iiv condi-
tion explains this, and the same view also explains why human life also 
“pervades” all the activities that are un-controversially part of the misery 
of a human person. Unfortunately, new nl theorists tend to overlook 
this obvious point. As we saw, provided we make some dialectically 
plausible assumptions, it follows from this double aspect of human 
life that human life cannot be a constituent part of human flourishing. 
The same can be said against similar arguments to the effect that 
the sort of dualism in question is unsound. Craig Paterson, for instance, 
offers the following argument: 
Bodies are intrinsically and not merely extrinsically valuable to us 
because they are seamlessly integral to the very reality of who and what 
we are as persons. A body is not something “sub-personal” to “personal 
life” as if x (consciousness life) can be radically juxtaposed with y  (bodily 
life) such that x can be held intrinsically valuable to us but not y. Both x 
and y are fully integral to our personal beingness. (51)
Nonetheless, the instrumentality view –as I have presented it, at 
least– is not that mere biological or “bodily” human life is instrumen-
tal to “conscious life”, but rather to human happiness. Furthermore, 
the instrumentality view should also hold that conscious life is merely 
instrumental to human happiness, because conscious human life is 
also a condition of human misery; so that, if it were a constituent of 
human happiness it would also have to be a constituent of human 
misery. Therefore –granted a few dialectically plausible assumptions– 
conscious life would be both intrinsically good and intrinsically evil, 
which is impossible. It is much more natural to think of both biologically 
minimal human life and conscious human life as instrumentally valu-
able, though nomologically indispensable, conditions of both human 
flourishing and misery.
A Digression Concerning the Minimal Definition of Human Life
Grisez and Boyle in particular assume a very thick concept of human 
life, a concept closer to what is sometimes called the “biographical” 
concept of life, and in any case, one that allows them to refer to the 
“underlying, pervasive, and inclusive character of life with respect to 
all of a person’s activities” (Grisez and Boyle 378) including “the most 
spiritual activities of human persons” (id. 380). But suppose we hold a 
much thinner concept of human life as the set of vital functions that 
is necessary and sufficient for a human organism not to be dead in the 
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ordinary sense: respiration, pulsation, metabolism, etc. If we assume 
this biologically minimal concept of life, it is obvious how different these 
functions or activities are to the ones that constitute human flourish-
ing, such as participating in friendship, knowledge, play, etc. Aristotle, 
for instance, clearly saw that the goodness of any “function” of human 
life that is not peculiar to humans, such as the goodness of the nutritive 
soul that characterizes the life of plants, “is not a constituent of good-
ness as a whole” (1219b22). 
On the other hand, if we assume a more robust notion of human life, 
as Grisez and Boyle do in criticizing the instrumentalist view, this later 
view seems perhaps more dubious, and life seems eminently “pervasive” 
and conceptually “inseparable”. And yet, even in this thicker sense of 
“human life” (i. e. conscious life) in which human life is said to pervade 
any activity admitted to be part of human flourishing, human life in this 
sense also pervades any activity admitted to be part of human misery. 
I think that Aristotle also saw this clearly, when he says that “without 
breathing or being awake or participating in movement we could not 
possess any good or any evil at all” (1214b20-22).
Therefore, it follows from my argument that whatever definition of 
“human life” we adopt, human life cannot be intrinsically good in the 
sense intended by the new nl theorist (i. e. a constitutive ingredient of 
human flourishing), and its value can only be the one appropriate to an 
iiv condition. This is the main conclusion of my argument. 
Before closing this article, however, it is worth considering an objec-
tion that has been levelled against the biologically minimal definition 
of human life that, as I have argued, should be adopted by new nl theo-
rists –the one tailored to a strict reading of the principle of inviolability. 
Animals and plants of all levels of complexity also have a life, and a 
sort of life that seems to contain the very same functions contained in 
the biologically minimal concept of human life. Nonetheless, new nl 
theorists emphatically deny that the lives of animals and plants have 
an inherently valuable standing. Accordingly, they need to resort to a 
biologically minimal concept of human life that allows them to attach 
an exclusive intrinsic value to the life that is peculiarly human, while 
excluding animal or plant life from this standing –even though these 
forms of life seem to partake of functional features relevantly similar 
to the ones contained in the minimal human concept. 
A good way of initially dealing with this problem is defining the 
basic concept of human life in terms of the basic vital functions of an 
organism having the complete set of standard human chromosomes.16 Now, 
16 See Gómez-Lobo (2002 10). Grisezand Boyle suggest a similar move. They argue that 
“biologically the remaining functions, however minimal, are such as no cabbage or 
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a minimal definition such as this solves the initial problem, because it 
offers a minimal definition of human life that at the same time excludes 
vegetable and animal life that would otherwise (in functional terms, for 
instance) seem to fulfill the very same definition. But now, a minimal 
definition such as this is open to another objection. Unless there are 
good reasons to think that the property of having the complete set of 
standard human chromosomes (or any other differentiating property 
fulfilling the same role) is a relevant feature for attributing an intrinsic 
value to the life of an organism having that property, a minimal defi-
nition such as this is open to the charge of being highly arbitrary. Jeff 
McMahan, for instance, has forcefully objected to this sort of defini-
tion on the grounds that it is unclear how “the bare difference between 
types of genes that individuals carry in their cells” (2002 212) can have 
any moral significance at all. 
I do not think this objection is unsurmountable, however. The value 
of human life is determined, according to nl theory, by its intrinsic con-
nection to human flourishing, and it might well be the case that only 
human flourishing has intrinsic value for us humans (and accordingly, 
that only human flourishing can ground a principle of inviolability). 
If this is so, then a differentiating property such as the one indicated 
above is not morally or axiologically arbitrary. Now, one might argue of 
course that this property in particular still sets too narrow a restriction, 
because we humans should also care about the flourishing of rational 
creatures in general, of which we might well be only one species among 
others –after all, human flourishing is of value to us as the flourishing 
of a rational creature; a creature capable of conceptual thought, delib-
eration, free choice, etc. But I see no conceptual barrier preventing the 
new nl theorist from preferring a non-biological distinguishing feature 
of human life-sustaining functions –such as “belonging to a rational 
creature”– in order to meet this latter demand. Notice, however, that the 
force of my objections is not diminished if the new nl theorist chooses 
an alternative definition such as this. 
Concluding Remarks
I have tried to show that human life cannot be shown to have an 
intrinsically valuable standing in the sense agreed upon by the parties 
in our objective and eudaimonistic dialectical setting, and further-
more, that in such a setting human life most plausibly emerges as an 
instrumental good, albeit a peculiar one. I believe that this is a note-
worthy result in its own right. But how serious a threat is this result 
carrot does, for they are still specifically human processes of specifically human organs” 
(Grisez and Boyle 1979 374, emphasis added).
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for the new nl theorist? What is of ultimate importance to the new nl 
theorist is the principle of inviolability, the normative principle that 
most characteristically distinguishes new nl theory from other moral 
theories. But surely this principle, one might think, can be based on 
normative concepts other than the concept of intrinsic or basic good. 
Most conspicuously perhaps, the concept of personal dignity. This pos-
sibility notwithstanding, however, even those new nl theorists initially 
attracted to this alternative recognize that an adequate defence of the 
principle of inviolability ultimately requires a distinct defence of the 
axiological claim (cf. Lee and George 2007 156-162, 2008 182).
Given the new nl method of justifying normative principles, this 
seems to be the right way to proceed for new nl ethicists. According to 
this method of justification, any claim to the effect that a certain item 
is intrinsically good generates an injunction to respect any instance of 
that good, in conjunction with what Gómez-Lobo calls “the prescriptive 
principle of Respect for Goods”, according to which “we should never 
intentionally destroy an instance of a human good because doing so 
would be an act of practical irrationality” (47). This is why the axiological 
claim can generate the principle of inviolability, and this is how new nl 
ethicists understand the principle when they resort to it in the context of 
applied ethics (cf. Oderberg 2000b 3, 67; Keown 41).Accordingly, if, as I 
have argued, such a claim turns out to be not only untenable relative to 
the new nl framework but also positively false relative to the objective 
eudaimonistic framework that the nl theorist is committed to accept, 
the principle of inviolability itself should inherit these shortcomings.
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